Russian Culture

Center for Democratic Culture

2012

Moral Culture: Public Morality and Private Responsibility
Igor Kon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, European History Commons, Other
Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Political History Commons, Slavic Languages and
Societies Commons, and the Social History Commons

Repository Citation
Kon, I. (2012). Moral Culture: Public Morality and Private Responsibility. In Dmitri N. Shalin, 1-24.
Available at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture/3

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Russian Culture by an authorized administrator of Digital
Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

Moral Culture: Public Morality and Private Responsibility
Igor Kon
What could be worse than socialism? -Whatever comes after it.
(Contemporary Russian joke).
When Mikhail Gorbachev unfurled his reform banners in the late 1980's,
many observers inside and outside Russia hailed perestroika as a moral
renaissance. The Soviet Union was indeed a spiritually bankrupt society at
the time, its citizens demanding a clean break with the past and yearning
for a better future. Despite the new openness or glasnost, the changes
have been slow in coming and often very controversial. A public opinion
survey conducted in February 1991 showed the country morally adrift and
deeply divided about the course of reforms. [1]
"What do you think about public morality in our country?," the researchers
asked a cross-section of the Russian population. Thirty one percent
answered that a sharp moral decline had taken place in the last few years.
Thirty five percent claimed things had not changed much, except for the
fact that what had earlier been hidden came to the fore. Twenty one
percent said that public morals have definitely changed, mostly for the
better. And thirteen percent could not answer this question.
As these findings suggest, moral malaise is wide-spread in today's Russia
. This is in large measure the legacy of the country's communist past. We
shall examine this legacy and its impact on the country's future, but first a
few words need to be said about the difficulties that students of moral
culture face in dealing with such a complex phenomenon.
An historical, interpretive approach to Soviet moral culture should
distinguish several interrelated yet analytically separate levels of morality.
First, there are official norms and principles that elucidate so-called
"communist morality" and that are spelled out in party documents, such
as "The Moral Code of the Builders of Communism," speeches and
pronouncements by party leaders. Second, there is the
theoretical/philosophical discourse where these moral norms are
systematically interpreted and presented to the public through newspaper
accounts, journal articles, textbooks, dictionaries, etc. Third, we have to
distinguish everyday moral consciousness -- moral beliefs and values as
reflected in the mass media, literature and art. And fourth, one should

address personal, subjective attitudes and motifs which guide the
individual's moral behavior and which could be judged only indirectly
through the person's conduct and stated reasons. The relationship
between these four levels of morality is complex, often muddled, and
sometimes plainly contradictory.
The easiest to grasp is the official moral ideology, which tends to be rigid
and formal in communist societies. Yet its real meaning could hardly be
understood without any reference to ethical discourse. The latter is more
sophisticated, flexible, context-dependent, and it often reveals subtle
differences of opinion. Neither official ideology nor formal ethical discourse
exhausts everyday moral consciousness, which takes for granted some
official principles, pays lip service to others, and ignores inconvenient
moral imperatives altogether. Quite often -- and not only in authoritarian
societies -- people think in one way, talk in another, and act in the third
way. What makes repressive societies different is that double-think is a
matter of survival for those living under the dictatorial regimes. Saying in
public what you really think and acting on your convictions could be
ruinous to your life. Henceforth, we have to be careful passing moral
judgments on people in communist societies. If such a judgment is
attempted, it must take into account the political context and specific
circumstances within which a particular action (or inaction) took place.
Clearly mistaken are those Western observers who view Soviet society as
a monolith, who bought the Soviet propaganda line about the internal
unity and stability of Soviet society. Equally wrong-headed are attempts
to divide Soviet citizens into honest prisoners and dishonest jailers: under
the Soviet regime, each person was likely to be both a victim and a jailer.
Finally, we should be skeptical about ex-communists who now profess
their undying hatred for communism. They are too quick to exonerate
themselves from past abuses while condemning Soviet society and its
members as morally corrupt. While it is true that this society forced
everyone to partake in the official hypocrisy, even if only passively, it is
not true that every one shares the same burden of responsibility for the
past.
A joke that dates back to the 1950's captures the peculiar moral situation
confronting the Soviet people. "God gave man three virtues -- intelligence,
honesty, and communist party membership; he stipulated, though, that
any one person could chose only two of these three virtues." That is to
say, a party member who is an honest person must be a fool. A bright
person and a party member is, by definition, dishonest. And a person who
is bright and honest could not be a communist party member. Now, when

my Russian colleagues insist that they had always been honest and acted
on their convictions, I have to question either their intelligence or their
credulity. As an old Russian proverb goes, "the drunk shall sleep off his
drunkenness, but the fool is forever a fool."
As a Soviet intellectual and once a member of the communist party, I
realize that the above considerations apply to myself. When an American
colleague familiar with my work recently wrote a reference letter on my
behalf in which he stated that Dr. Kon was a man of integrity who "never
compromised" with the Soviet system, I told him that I felt honored, but
that his evaluation was basically wrong. Throughout my life, I have had to
make compromises, sometimes very painful ones; otherwise, I would
have been unable to work under the Soviet censorship system and publish
my research that made a difference for my people. Life without moral and
political compromises is impossible even in a liberal democratic society.
So, what do you expect from us, poor devils from a
totalitarian/authoritarian country? Why should we pretend to have been
better than we actually were, better even than an average person in your
country? Please do not hold us for a role model, we have our own lives to
live. Besides, an uncompromising stance praised by all revolutionaries,
including Bolsheviks, would be a poor foundation for a market democracy.
Moral values may be absolute and moral judgments categorical, but what
about moral action? Whenever we convert our beliefs into actions, we
have to take risks, calculate the consequences, judge the lesser evil. The
question, therefore, is not whether good, moral people should compromise
but which compromise could be ethically justified and which one could not.
With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to moral culture and
moral reasoning in Soviet society.
The Foundations of Communist Morality
Moral reasoning conceals within itself a contradiction. On the one hand,
there are ultimate values, absolute norms, and rigid imperatives which
furnish standards for separating good from evil and determining ethical
conduct. On the other hand, moral reasoning presupposes free will and
personal freedom as a basis for individual moral choice and responsibility.
The relationship between these two sides of morality is a dialectical one; it
is bound to produce paradoxes and complicate practical moral judgment.
The moral system generated by communist ideologies is rather unique in
that it seeks to dispense with both key elements of traditional morality.
Marxist sociological historicism doesn't recognize any absolute, extra-

social and trans-historical moral values. At the same time, communism is
decidedly anti-individualistic and anti-libertarian. By putting social (state,
party, group) loyalties above individual rights, Marxist collectivism tends
to nourish moral irresponsibility and expedient conformity. In its infancy,
the Soviet regime denounced any morality as a bourgeois invention, a
vestige of religion alien to a society undergoing a communist revolution.
Disputes about the revolutionary proletariat and a new morality that might
replace the traditional one were extremely popular in the early '20s. As
soon as the revolutionary order stabilized, however, Soviet ideologists
came to the conclusion that the new society needed moral legitimation.
In his famous speech at the Third Congress of the Russian Communist
Youth Union, given on October 2, 1920 , Lenin announced that all
education and teaching of contemporary youth should be the "education in
the spirit of communist morality." [2] He hastened to add that the
proletarian morality will have nothing to do with the old moral systems. ".
. . Our morality is completely subservient to the interests of the
proletarian class struggle. Our morality is deduced from the interests of
the proletariat"; "the fundamentals of communist morality help us
strengthen and complete our struggle for communism." [3]
This relativistic formula lends itself to different interpretations, including a
humanistic one. Insofar as the Marxist social utopia -- communism -- aims
at universal justice and seeks to abolish all exploitation, it can be taken to
mean that "only that which is moral expresses the proletariat's interests
and strengthens communism." [4] However, this liberal paraphrase only
serves to show how loosely and arbitrarily the Marxist dogma was
interpreted in the Soviet Union , especially in its waning years, when base
intentions were papered over with good reasons. We should bear in mind
that Lenin's formula was not just a theoretical statement, an abstract
philosophical doctrine. It should be judged against the backdrop of
ruthless bolshevik practices. In this specific historical context, Lenin's
reduction of morality to class interests and the subordination of ethics to
political expediency should be taken literally. Neither Lenin nor his
successors have ever reasoned morally. Moral language simply helped the
authorities legitimate their political interests and justify their policies.
Having dispensed with God as an ultimate value-giver and the individual
as a free agent responsible for one's action, communists confronted the
problem of grounding their moral values. In the 1920s, it was a messianic
class -- "Proletariat" -- that was proclaimed to be the repository of the
new moral vision. In the 30's, the party paid only lip service to "the
interests of the working class." Undivided loyalty emerged as the cardinal

virtue -- the loyalty to the Communist party, which proclaimed itself "the
mind, honor and consciousness of our time," and to the state, which took
the place of civil society. There was no place left to privacy (the Soviet
man had no right to lead a private life hidden from or unaccountable to
the party) nor for moral decisions (the Party, the state, a working
collective were always right). The individual's civil duty was to the state,
his political loyalty -- to the Communist party. Even at the peak of the
totalitarian repression, however, elements of moral culture survived in the
mass consciousness.
Basic moral feelings like compassion and solidarity continued to linger.
Publicly, everybody was applauding the infamous show trials against
political dissidents that shook the country in 1937 and demanded death to
"enemies of the people." But privately some people tried to help the
victims in spite of great personal risks. The Maxim Gorky formula, "If the
enemy does not surrender, it must be liquidated," did not stamp out the
compassion for the innocent victims who suffered during the political
purges.
Another factor that spared traditional morality from total extinction and
that became the trademark of Soviet moral culture was what George
Orwell called "double-think" -- the capacity to rename things and to
combine, quite sincerely and without guilt, incompatible beliefs about the
same subject. To some extent, double-think was really a condition for
survival. The official values were to be taken on faith and obeyed
unswervingly. Yet anybody naive or stupid enough to do so would be
doomed, for the Soviet system never worked in line with its official
pronouncements. At the same time, rejecting official values in toto would
have been socially dysfunctional: everyone had to use the official
language, and it was easier to do so automatically, without much
reflection. Complete and self-conscious cynicism with its sharp division
between public and private life would be unbearable for most people.
Double-think is fundamentally amoral. It is incompatible with individual
self-realization and moral responsibility. Yet paradoxically, it could
occasionally provoke reflection on the reasoning and language that best
applies to the given context and circumstances. And by their very nature,
reflection and doubt are subversive and anti-totalitarian. Thus, doublethink is a doubly manipulative strategy: it helps the system manipulate
individual consciousness, but it also allows the individual to evade the
pressures from the system and to turn one's subservience into lip service.
The official pronouncements on Soviet moral culture were always

internally contradictory and, like in every orthodoxy, the changing
interpretations of the dogma were more important than the dogma itself.
After Stalin's death, Soviet society grew more socially, politically and
culturally heterogeneous. This is when conflicting interpretations of
Communist morality emerged. It was increasingly more difficult to figure
out what the "genuine communist morality" was all about. As
contradictions mounted, so did the conscious and unconscious hypocrisy.
The growing normative uncertainty, rightly perceived by party watch-dogs
as the sign of a moral crisis, accorded a greater freedom of choice to
individuals, who could no longer blame their action or inaction on harsh
reprisals and were increasingly confronted with the need to rationalize
their conduct in moral terms. Indeed, freedom of choice is the very
essence of morality. It is absent in a truly totalitarian culture, where you
either have to accept the dominant ideology in its entirety or renounce
any chance to work constructively within the existing society. Once the
Soviet Union began to shed its Stalinist legacy, moral reasoning grew in
prominence among Soviet citizens and even inside the communist party
itself.
The gradual emancipation of moral consciousness from political
expediency was slow and painful. The first breakthrough came in the 50's,
when a relative autonomy and independence of morality from the
economy and politics was reaffirmed. [5] The first sign of the revival of
moral reflection was the emergence of ethical discourse. Intellectually
primitive at first, it raised some new, or, to be more precise, quite old but
completely forgotten questions. Critically important in this respect were
the liberal reforms attempted by Nikita Khrushchev.
The Communist party was interested not in changing society but in
preserving its rule. The language of universal moral values suited this
purpose much better than relativistic class consciousness. The
moralization of Soviet ideology meant its partial depoliticization, as well as
the recognition of private life. Still, the private sphere was understood
quite narrowly as encompassing primarily marriage and the family, and
even then, the individual was expected to follow the general guidelines
laid down by the Communist party. It is remarkable that neither the
"Philosophical Encyclopedia" published in the 1960's nor six consecutive
editions of "The Dictionary of Ethics" that appeared between 1965 and
1989 had an entry on private or personal life, which was mentioned only
in passim, with the standard reminder that private life should not be
opposed to public life. Notice that these were among the most liberal
publications of its time.

The Communist party had its own reasons to emphasize the moral
underpinnings of reforms. For one thing, moral reasoning was aimed at
the excesses of revolutionary morality which claimed countless victims,
including devoted party members, during the Stalinist era. Also, the
moralization of politics was meant to tap some new sources of productivity
in the labor force. A good example how the party used morality was the
Moral Code of the Builders of Communism, which was incorporated into
the Communist Party Program in 1961. While emphasizing the importance
and specificity of moral norms, this Code presented morality in a formal
and authoritarian manner as a set of prescriptions for moral conduct,
which, the document claimed, had already been realized in Soviet society.
Public opinion in the Soviet Union did not buy this premise. The Moral
Code was generally perceived as a clumsy piece of propaganda and a
monument to official hypocrisy.
While from the party's standpoint the Moral Code was chiefly a new
ideological tool for social control, liberal intellectuals managed to use it as
an instrument of social criticism. The emphasis upon universal human
values made more evident unfulfilled promises and moral inadequacies
inherent in the Soviet regime. Such concepts as "personality," "self" and
"moral responsibility" which were very much suspect in the 30's and 40's,
got a foothold in public discourse in the 60's. Conformism was openly
spurned and personal integrity and autonomy highly praised. The notion
of alienation also made a comeback, as did the ideas of human rights and
religious freedom.
In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted from power, and the country entered the
stagnation era marked by the inept leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. This
shift made all the more painfully evident the tension between the
developing moral consciousness and the amoral social practices. At the
level of mass consciousness, "morality was put on the very top of the
value pyramid; it emerged as the fundamental hidden truth if not of the
whole being, then at least of the spiritual life." [6] Yet socially and
economically, Soviet life amounted to the highly institutionalized
inefficiency and corruption.
Judged against the backdrop of daily life, the new morality itself was
exceedingly contradictory. Already in the early 70's, sociological research
could not support the official propaganda claim about the total
incompatibility of the Western/capitalist and Soviet/socialist ways of life.
Soviet laborers were expected to be motivated chiefly by moral incentives
in their work, by the commitment to building a glorious society of the
future. In fact, the research showed that industrial workers considered a

"good salary" and "their families' interests" as the most salient factors
contributing to their job satisfaction. And since a "good salary" was hardly
ever paid, work was losing its centrality in laborers' value system. This
shift in Soviet workers' attitudes was consistent with the trends that
Western researchers found in the capitalist labor force. [7] The surveys of
Soviet workers and engineers conducted in the 70's showed that the
values of creativity and initiative topped the list in the hierarchy of
personal values, while self-discipline, meticulousness and punctuality bore
chiefly a negative connotation. A distinct shift in personal interests away
from the sphere of work and public affairs to family life and consumer
activity was undeniable. [8]
For the ruling Communist party this shift was ideologically subversive and
economically dysfunctional. The official ideology exhorted workers to
improve labor discipline, to do more for less. This Communist work ethic
very much resembled the Protestant work ethic in its emphasis on
symbolic rather than material rewards. The latter were denounced as
hedonist and bourgeois-decadent. This moralizing propaganda was highly
inefficient. Nobody, including Party officials themselves, was taking it
seriously. People did not want to work for the glory of the communist
future and sought to escape from the hopelessly bureaucratized public life
into the private worlds where they could pursue personal, psychedelic and
spiritual interests, like literature, music, family life, sex or drinking.
Everyday moral culture was becoming more and more individualistic. And
it was possible to defend this trend theoretically by using the Marxist
theory of alienation which decried work under the conditions of
exploitation, work devoid of meaning and precluding the all-round
development of personality.
To sum up, moral language that became popular in the 60's and 70's
served both conservative and critical purposes. While it was used by the
party to re-legitimize its rule, it also served the liberal forces to highlight
the country's problems and push it toward further reforms. Yet, when
social, economic and political issues are treated not in their own terms but
are couched in moral language, you can be sure that nobody is taking
them seriously enough or earnestly trying to solve them. Moral reasoning
is no substitute for serious economic and political thinking. It may express
a general discontent but it does not offer constructive solutions. Moral
criticism is often utopian and implicitly conservative, even though its
explicit thrust is critical.
Before the 70's, the moral opposition to the regime relied chiefly on the
communist terminology and juxtaposing "humanist" Marxism to Stalinist

"distortions." The situation changed in the 60s when pro-Western
dissidents singled out human rights as the central political and moral
issue, thus elevating individual freedom above the state interests. On the
other side, Christian morality revitalized the discourse about absolute,
eternal and transhistorical moral values. Looked at from both these
perspectives, the Soviet regime appeared economically moribund and
morally depraved beyond salvation. Meanwhile, social escapism and
passive resistance to the regime gained momentum among the general
population.
Postcommunist Moral Culture
Changes in the former Soviet Union have been fast, dramatic, permeating
all spheres of social and private life. There was no time for people to
adjust to these changes gradually, to internalize them one after another.
These transformations left in their wake a political turmoil which ripped at
the fabric of society and hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union . It
would be impossible for any nation to take these momentous changes in
stride, and Soviet people have been exceedingly ill prepared by their
history for this rapid transformation.
Soviet culture and personality were geared not to innovation and change
but to stability and stagnation. For many decades, communist ideology
remained extremely conservative. Even small innovations provoked
suspicion. Social and cultural life was dull and tedious. A "secure future" -the main advantage that socialism had to offer over capitalism -- had in
practice meant an endless repetition of the past. This climate was
suffocating for every creative personality. But for ordinary people, this
stagnant life style became a norm, and when the winds of change finally
began to sweep through society, it caught the vast majority of the
population totally unprepared for the new challenges and opportunities.
Social change is inseparable from self-change, from the experimentation
with new identities. Yet the Soviet system systematically discouraged such
experimentation. Individuality was suppressed as a sign of bourgeois
individualism incompatible with the virtues of the new Soviet man. The
primitive egalitarianism in wages, the fear of competition, and especially
the bureaucratic mentality which equated the individual with a "cog" in an
impersonal clock-like social mechanism -- all conspired to stifle personal
initiative. The category of human rights which historically helped the
individual to hold his own against the state was eclipsed by the concept of
the individual's obligations to society. The monistic worldview endemic to
the Soviet Marxism -- "one party, one truth, one leader" -- bred a rigid,

authoritarian, impervious to doubt personality and militated against the
cognitive complexity and intellectual tolerance sorely needed in times of
rapid change. No wonder that the reforms plunged the Soviet man into
the state of confusion and made him perceive perestroika as a menace or,
as the saying goes, "katastroika."
Loss of identity. According to official propaganda, "Soviet man" possesses
the following unimpeachable traits: (a) he accepts the party's goals and
principles and elevates society's interests over personal ones; (b) the
work for the public good is for him the major source of meaning, dignity
and fulfillment in life; (c) solidarity, collectivism and internationalism are
the norms which guide his relations with other people. [9] Needless to
say, hardly any Soviet person took this ideological fiction seriously. At
best, it was a vague normative statement telling people what they were
supposed to be or, rather, appear. More often than not, this was but an
ideological verbiage with no direct link to reality.
As an antidote to this irritating ideological cliche, an ironic version of
Soviet man or Homo Sovieticus was formed in public mind. Its more
popular name -- "Sovok" -- emerged in the 80s. The word means in
Russian a little shovel, which can be used for any purposes, especially for
collecting dust. "Sovok" was a personological correlate of the Soviet lifestyle, a modal personality marked by conformism, laziness, inefficiency,
hypocrisy and irresponsibility. These traits were attributed to others.
Nobody ever said "I am Sovok." The retort -- "But yes, you are!" -- would
be terribly insulting. One could openly acknowledge and discuss these
traits without any damage to one's self-esteem. The guilty party was the
social system; its victims -- other individuals, never the person who used
the term. It was a more or less conscious strategy of self-alienation that
dispirited Soviets used to distance themselves from their society and its
official values.
Few people would really lament the disappearance of the Soviet man so
defined. But the adjective "Soviet" also designated a certain civil
(citizenship) and geographical (country) status. Now this connotation is
rendered meaningless and useless. Many other terms describing social
roles and statuses associated with the Soviet system (party membership,
academic degrees, social privileges, public prestige) have lost their power
to confer a meaningful identity on the individual. Urgently needed are new
self-definitions framed in more personal, non-bureaucratic terms. Finding
them, however, proves a daunting task for many people.
Let me offer a personal example. Who am I? In the past, while traveling

abroad, I would usually mention my formal Soviet identity first. Now my
identity is far more problematic. Am I Russian? First and foremost, this
term signifies an ethnic identity, and claiming to be a Russian, I would
seem to renounce my half-Jewish origins. Am I a Jew? Psychologically,
such a claim would be dubious. My language, culture, and education have
been Russian. Long ago, I learned to feel myself Jewish because of antisemitism and discrimination, but an identity so acquired tends to be
tenuous and negative. My political identity is also problematic. After
leaving the Communist Party in 1990, I lost a formal political affiliation
and no longer wish to have any. My basic values are democratic and proWestern, but I don't believe that Russian society can transform itself into
a democracy overnight. I have written many books and articles; some, I
believe, are reasonably good; but the criteria by which I judge my past
work have changed and a critical self-examination is now clearly in order.
I was born and lived through most of my life in Leningrad . Now my town
is called St. Petersburg . Yet for me, whatever my attitudes to Lenin, Peter
the Great or Saint Peter, this name has only a dim historical connotation. I
have been deprived of my birth-place -- symbolically. So, everything in
my life is problematic; whatever self-definition comes to the fore, I could
not help feeling like an impostor.
This self-reflection is more than the usual intellectual autoerotic play with
existentialist categories. The people who, unlike myself, cannot indulge
themselves in translating their uneasiness into theoretical concepts, may
want to take revenge upon someone who they think had ruined their
country, stolen their glorious past, and destroyed their familiar selves. I
do not share these feelings, but I can understand them.
Adolescent syndrome. This syndrome is marked by several interrelated
qualities, such as the lack of historicity -- "before us, there was nothing
valuable"; maximalism -- "everything or nothing"; impatience "everything
immediately"; and negativism -- "nothing is working and should be
changed." A trait found in all revolutionary visionaries and reinforced by
the messianic attitudes of the pre-1917 Russian intelligentsia, the
adolescent syndrome is unmistakable in today's radical democrats.
The 1917 vintage Leninists believed that all previous world history had
been merely a pre-history and that "genuine history" began only with
themselves. The old world injustice should have been completely
destroyed and the brave new socialist world built on its ruins. The results
of this reckless attitude are well known. Present-day anti-communists
believe that 70 years of Soviet history were completely wrong and
everything done during this time should be remade from scratch and as

soon as possible. This is the old communist mentality in reverse. Before
1987, everything Soviet was by definition good and everything Western
was bad. Now it's just the opposite: everything undesirable, including
global problems (like pollution and drug-addiction) is attributed to bad
Communist policies. The market economy, on the contrary, is seen as a
synonym of humanism and social justice.
Envy. Like the adolescent syndrome, envy is a global phenomenon. It is
much easier to love a stranger, someone you do not know, than your own
neighbor. According to an old Moslem joke, Allah once decided to reward a
holy man: "For your holiness," he told him, "I will fulfil your every wish,
but on one condition -- whatever you ask for, your neighbor will receive
twice as much." After a long deliberation, the holy man said: "O, Allah!
Take out one of my eyes!"
There are two strategies to cope with this grudging attitude. One is
predicated on competition: "I'm better than my neighbor, and I will prove
it by working harder and having more than he has!" The second strategy
is envy: "I'm better than my neighbor, and I will not permit him to have
more than I have!" It is not just a psychological but also a social
phenomenon. In the pre-industrial -- Gemeinschaft -- societies,
individuals were very tolerant to the out-group inequalities which were
based on the estate/status differences and held to be natural,
unchangeable and unquestionable. The individual's aspirations were
strongly related to his social origin and status. The peasants did not
compare themselves with the nobility; they lived in a very different social
and cultural worlds. Yet the same people were extremely sensitive and
intolerant to the good fortune of those around them (the communal envy).
This phenomenon can be interpreted in several ways. In preindustrial
societies people tend to believe that one person's gain means somebody
else's loss: the amount of available goods being limited, valuable things
can be obtained only through a redistribution, at somebody else's
expense, which is judged to be socially and morally unjust. [10] People
shun social differentiation; they have a generalized mistrust of any
individual achievement, because it threatens to undermine familiar power,
prestige and authority relationships. Being a "greedy institution" [11] ,
Gemeinschaft "requires complete involvement of the individual, stability of
social relations, and lack of differentiation of the personality as well as of
the labor performed." [12] Because public, personal, anonymous, and
face-to-face relations are relatively undifferentiated in preindustrial
societies, the change in somebody's wealth or status undermines not only
the power structure but the whole network of the interpersonal relations

within the community. People do not want these changes, hence -- strong
envious reactions.
These conditions change with the onset of the market economy, social
mobility, urbanization and the attendant growth in anonymity. Social
stratification is no longer taken for granted and seen as something natural
and immutable; the social origin does not predetermine the aspirations of
the individual, who can compare himself to and compete with anybody
within and outside his group. The growing competition breeds intergroup,
class and status envy, but these social conflicts are less likely to be
personalized. The public consciousness accepts the fact that social and
financial success can result not only from someone's unseemly action, but
from personal initiative and industriousness, which are redefined as
positive qualities. Intra-group rivalry and envy do not disappear but
become less odious, as well as less efficient as means of social control.
Now, if we turn to Russian history, we discover that traditional peasant
community existed there much longer and was considerably stronger than
in the West. Egalitarian attitudes were further legitimized by the Russian
intelligentsia's anti-capitalist mentality which idealized the village
commune. The independent farmer -- "kulak" -- was the most hated
figure in early 20th century Russian classical literature. The levelling
mentality sanctified by the communist ideology served to reinforce these
negative attitudes and further discourage personal initiative among Soviet
citizens.
An old anecdote captures the situation well. As the 1917 revolution rages
in the streets of Petrograd , a countess asks her maid about the noisy
crowds outside: "What do these people want?" -- "They urge that there be
no more rich people." "Isn't that strange?", says the puzzled old lady. "We
always dreamed that there should be no poor people."
Marx himself was well aware of envy's corrosive power. He defined
primitive egalitarian "barracks communism" as "the envy, institutionalized
as a power." [13] Yet the abolition of private property and forced
collectivization undermined individual autonomy and industriousness in
the Russian population, infusing it with the vicious, militant, envious
lumpen mentality, which effectively blocked every individual effort to do
better and to rise above the average. Not to permit anybody to get ahead
of you was psychologically more important than to move up personally
and improve everybody's well-being. Combining hatred toward the higherups with the envy toward the social equals, this mentality had a disastrous
impact on the fate of perestroika itself. In retrospect, the privatization

campaign must have been first carried out not in state-owned industry but
in agriculture. Gorbachev's steps toward individual farming were rather
timid, and even those were undermined by the Party and collective farm
bureaucracies, as well as by envious neighbors who dreaded the changes
and cast independent farmers as their worst class enemies. Envy,
disguised as a social justice, is the most powerful enemy of social and
economic progress.
Privileges versus rights . The Soviet mentality resembled a feudal society,
insofar as it elevated the particularistic norm of group privilege over the
universalistic principle of human rights. Each social group or strata in the
Soviet Union had its own set of privileges. Some privileges were legal and
open, others -- illegal and secret. For example, high level party and state
officials received the so-called "Kremlevka" -- an assortment of quality
food items for a symbolic price that had hardly changed in some 40 years.
The material advantages residing in one's status were often far more
substantial than anything one could purchase on a salary. The lost status
meant lost privileges. To use your privilege was both your right and your
duty. The privilege distribution worked as a powerful leverage to insure
the individual's loyalty.
Years ago, a person I knew was appointed a "special consultant" to the
Central Committee -- a position that entitled him to receive a "Kremlevka"
package. Being a bachelor and a human being of unusual moral qualms,
he decided not to use this privilege. After he failed to collect his package
for the first time, he was politely reminded about it by an administrator.
The second time around, he was summoned by his boss:
"Do you like your new job, is everything okay?"
"Yes, I do, thank you very much."
"Then why don't you claim your Kremlevka?"
"I don't need it, I eat in the cafeteria."
"A lot of people in Moscow would be grateful if you gave them this food,
it's up to you. But when you don't take it, it looks like you want to be
different and better than your colleagues here, and this is unacceptable.
We hope that this issue will never come up again."
Economically, the highly stratified system of privileges resulted from the
permanent shortages endemic to Soviet society. It was a particular way of
rationing and distributing scarce goods. Yet, the symbolic meaning that
the privileges carried with them outweighed their material value. Hard
work did not suffice if you wanted to get access to a certain good -- you

had to "belong," to find your way into a prestigious organization. Already
in the early '30s, famous Soviet satirists, Ilia Ilf and Evgeny Petrov,
parodied this system by concocting an announcement: "The beer is sold
only to the trade-union members." The more prestigious an organization,
the more sophisticated were its privileges. The Party Central Committee
was especially ingenuous in marking status differences without any
concern for the communists' professed egalitarianism. Even the smallest
change in ritual was a serious social event. According to Fedor Burlatsky,
a noted Soviet journalist, a department head in the Communist Party
Central Committee was entitled to have lunch in his office; his deputy
could order for himself and his visitors a free cup of tea with biscuits;
and zavsektorom or subdivision head, could count on a cup of tea but
without biscuits. One day a liberal ruling was handed down the line: from
now on, zavsektorom could request biscuits along with his tea. To mark
the difference between him and his superior, however, the administration
would provide a genuine cotton napkin to go with the deputy's tea-cup,
while zavsektorom had to make do with just tea and simple paper napkin.
Similar hierarchy reigned in the academic institutions, and universities,
industrial plants. The National Academy of Sciences, for example, had two
medical centers: one for simple mortals and a special one (everything
privileged, exclusive, and superior in quality was dabbed "special") for the
most distinguished full professors. Yet within the special dispensary there
was -- and still is -- its own hierarchy. If a professor was waiting for his
turn before the doctor's office (the lines generally were not too long) and
an Academy's corresponding member came along, the last person to show
up would go first. If the Academy's full member would show up -- he had
a clear precedence over a corresponding member. Status was more
important than appointment. So, sometime these highly esteemed
gentlemen would have to explain to each other who was who: "Excuse
me, please, I am a full member of the Academy and have to go first." "I
beg your pardon, I am also a full Academy member and director of the
Institute, so you will have to wait. . . ."
At the Novosibirsk branch of the Academy of Sciences , I once heard
about a jocular announcement posted in the campus store: "The imported
furniture is now in stock and will be available for sale. Academicians are
entitled to a dining-room, corresponding members -- to a bedroom,
professors-doctors -- to a study, candidates of science (Ph.D.) -- to an
office desk, and junior research associates without scientific degrees -- to
a kitchen stool."
The hierarchy of privileges embedded in the Soviet distribution system

had a direct bearing on a person's self-esteem. But the same people who
resented the privileges accorded to a higher strata, were convinced that
their own privileges were richly deserved: "Surely, these lazy and
arrogant party apparatchiks have too much. But I am a full professor, my
time is more valuable than that of a young assistant, why should I wait in
line? I have a legal and moral right to be served first." That is to say,
Soviet citizens were fighting not for the rights but for the privileges, and
the acute sense of identity loss in today's Russia is more than a little
tinged with the nostalgia for the lost privileges. This particular form of
distributive justice was a part of the ancient bureaucratic ethos; it is still
very much alive, and it constitutes a formidable barrier to market reforms
and advances in human rights. Learned helplessness. For many decades
Soviet economy and social life was a highly institutionalized inefficiency,
every individual initiative being directly or indirectly punishable. The
harder one tried, the more frustrated and helpless one was made to feel.
Everything progressive was doomed in advance. In the late '70s,
struggling for the recognition and institutionalization of Soviet sociology,
my colleagues and I used to repeat the same cheer: "Let's drink to the
success of our hopeless endeavor!" One of my friends used to quote the
advice that an old prostitute gave to her young colleagues: "First of all,
girls, don't make fuss when you are under the customer!" However
boundless, your energy would sooner or later run out and you would get
tired fighting the authorities. Productive social activity was being gradually
eliminated and replaced by bureaucratic simulation and meaningless
rituals. The predominant and ever growing feeling in the '70s and '80s
was social indifference and apathy.
This situation taught the individual "learned helplessness," which also
functioned as a rational strategy for survival and, paradoxically, for
getting ahead. While people with ideas and ambitions were frowned upon,
politically savvy mediocrities were in demand. The complete social and
moral irresponsibility went hand in hand with a low level of aspirations,
expectations and performance. The worker's salary had been virtually
unrelated to either quantity or quality of his work, and he knew that his
elementary needs would be met by the state. An independent person
would find this situation humiliating and intolerable, but most people
learned to play the game and wait for the authorities to improve their lot.
The USSR used to be a country of petty bureaucrats. Everybody, from the
industrial worker to the university professor, was a state official. Both the
Soviet social system and the system of socialization have been essentially
maternalistic. The Communist Party, like an authoritarian mother, knew
your "rational needs" better than you did yourself. She might have

punished you for your mistakes but she always had "your best interests at
heart." The party and the state took care of you, and this authoritarian
care and control were accepted as natural. Today, nobody seems to care
and many people feel abandoned and helpless, seeing no better future
ahead. Hence, the widespread pessimism, fear, and apocalyptic
expectations, which sometime turn out to be self-fulfilling prophesies.
Traditionalism. The current Russian reforms are both democratic, insofar
as they are directed against authoritarianism, and conservative, because
they seek to restore the pre-socialist, capitalist social order. But how far
back could we go? If the postmodernism is a drive into the unknown
future, post-communist traditionalism, like Moslem fundamentalism, is a
groping for the unknown past. The recent past is rejected in favor of
something more distant, something thoroughly forgotten. It is a return not
to the "real" historical past, but to the idealized, imaginary past, where
everything used to be moral and beautiful.
This conservative utopia is multifaceted. On the one side, it reflects the
global disillusionment with modernity, a response to its contradictions and
excesses. On the other side, it is a continuation of the Brezhnev's era
social inertia, with its emphasis on stability and continuity. Finally, it is a
specific form of anti-communist ideology.
Traditionalism is usually presented as a renaissance of spirituality, of the
universal (read religious and moral) values and national traditions
distorted or suppressed by the Communist regime. But very often
traditionalists appeal not only to the presocialist but to the precapitalist
and preindustrial times and mores, conceived in exceedingly idealized
terms. The traditionalist utopia is both unrealistic and authoritarian; you
can't turn history back and make people live according to the rules which
had grown problematic or lost their legitimacy centuries ago. But the
greatest danger of traditionalism is that it is strongly linked with the
primitive and militant nationalism.
Prospects for the Future
The attitudes bred by the Soviet system do not bode well for Russia 's
moral rejuvenation and its ambitious economic and political reforms. The
question is how -- some would ask whether -- this social heritage can be
overcome.
On the methodological grounds, I am skeptical about the view that paints
"Homo Sovieticus" as an immutable entity. "National character," "modal

personality" and similar concepts do better as loose metaphors than
analytical concepts. This is not to suggest that historical continuity in the
Russian or any other case is a fiction. [14] The interrelated syndromes
mentioned above had been spotted long before the Bolsheviks came to
power and described by the Russian writers as "oblomovism" (passivity,
indecision, incapacity for action), "manilovism" (daydreaming and castlebuilding as a substitute for practical deeds), and "khlestakovism"
(irresponsibility, boastfulness and cheating). But then, early '20th century
Russian capitalism was created not by Oblomovs, Manilovs, and
Khlestakovs. Envious and passive at home, "Sovok" is often quite
successful after he has left Russia and settled in the USA or Israel , where
the standards and expectations are different and where his efforts are
duly rewarded. If people can be competitive, industrious, and thriving in
emigration, why could not they do the same back home now that the
social system is being changed? Perhaps, they could, but first they have to
confront the legacy of the past, and that means reinventing their selves.
The loss of identity is particularly hard on the old people and for those
with a vested interest in the Communist system: the party and state
officials whose bureaucratic mentality and experiences became useless
and dysfunctional. Any intellectually rigid person is likely to find an
adaptation to the changing conditions a trying task. But let us not
overlook private entrepreneurs, independent managers, and others who
found personal resources to meet the new challenges head-on. The age
difference is a major factor in predicting how the individual responds to
the economic, political, and moral upheavals in postcommunist Russia .
What for people of my generation might be a disaster, the young men and
women often see as an opportunity. Without established social identities
and privileges, they have nothing to lose. Recent public opinion polls show
a sharp contrast between the older, less-educated, rural population, on
the one hand, and the younger, better-educated, urban respondents, on
the other. Sixty three percent of the respondents below 25 had a positive
attitude toward private property and market economy, compared to
nineteen percent among those 60 years and older. [15] In another survey
conducted in 1992, three fifths of the respondents answered "no" to the
question whether perestroika was a worthwhile undertaking. Several
months later, eighty percent said that life was better before perestroika.
Younger, better educated and urban dwellers, as well as individuals with
connections to private and joint enterprises, strongly disagreed with that
opinion. [16] People from this category were more willing to take personal
risks in economic competition and strenuously opposed egalitarianism.
[17] The youth tends to be more optimistic about their own future. When

pollsters asked them, "Are young people capable of hard work?" -seventy one percent answered "yes." Seventy nine percent believed that
the young people could show initiative. [18] These high hopes on the part
of young people are more important for the country's future than the fears
and anxieties besetting the older generation.
Age and education are also linked with the general shift to postmaterialist
values. The 1990 survey conducted in the European part of the USSR and
another one carried out in the Russian Federation in January 1991,
showed an upsurge of postmaterialist, spiritual values. "Like other
advanced industrial societies," the researchers conclude, " Russia seems
to be undergoing an intergenerational shift from the overwhelmingly
Materialist values to increasingly Postmaterialist values -- and this shift
brings with it growing mass pressures for democratization."
[19] Postmaterialists are much more likely to support core democratic
values -- free speech, pluralistic politics, independent mass media,
competitive elections and political tolerance.
All this sounds promising, but today's Russian youth has been shaped not
by the nascent social order but by the decomposing old system. As the
sociological research by Inglehart and his associates show, the high levels
of trust and subjective well-being necessary for economic and political
cooperation flourish in times of economic prosperity and individual
security. Yet, the data from the 1990 World Values survey in Eastern
Europe "reveal the lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded. . .
. In the surveys carried out in Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia and
Lithuania, about as many people describe themselves as "unhappy" as
"happy," and about as many say they are 'dissatisfied with their lives as a
whole' as say they are 'satisfied.'" This is an extraordinary and alarming
finding. In 1990, these societies ranked far below much poorer countries
such as India , Nigeria or China . . . . We view this as an indication of
profound malaise among the general public." [20]
The young people are not exempt from this malaise. There is a
tremendous gap between their ultimate values and long-term goals, on
the one hand, and their short-term plans and available means, on the
other. The post-communist youth is decidedly materialist and procapitalist in their broad outlooks, but their capacity for honest, hard work
is less than obvious. The commonly expressed desire is to get rich quickly,
without much effort and sacrifice. According to a Russian public opinion
survey conducted in September 1991, the most popular answer (fifty
three percent) to the question "What is most important for the young
people?" was "material well-being," and the least popular (three percent)

-- "public activity." And this is not just an overreaction to the old
hypocritical communist cliches.
Young people mature fast. As the 1993 national opinion poll shows,
getting an education and a steady job for a certain salary has lost its
appeal, while the prestige of going into business has gone up. Thirty five
percent of those polled said that the best thing to do for a sixteeneighteen year-old man today is to study, eight percent mentioned getting
a job, and 19 percent of the young men singled out business (only five
percent of the respondents felt that business was a sound option for a
young woman). Twenty four percent of the respondents in this poll did not
make up their minds, and as many listed another venue as the most
promising opportunity today.
Comparative analysis of job motivation and long-term life plans among
Russian and Ukrainian teenagers (high school students) in 1985 and
1991[21]reveals these three consistent trends: (a) the growing concern
with money and other material values; (b) the sharp rise in social
expectations, be it salary, prestige, or power position; (c) the drastic drop
in the willingness to take on hard or unpleasant work. But if in 1985 the
high school graduates' expectations had been reasonably realistic, i.e.,
they hoped for what they could realistically achieve, in 1991 their
expectations surged up dramatically and became utterly unrealistic. Now
teenagers want to have everything, to have everything immediately, and
to have it without making an extra effort. They also expect more help
from their parents and public institutions than is possible in these troubled
times. These hedonistic and dependency-bound expectations are
dysfunctional both for the socioeconomic and moral development. Such an
orientation is more likely to get a young person involved in crime than in
constructive efforts. And the crime rate in Russia is growing dangerously
high.
Another dream of young people is the emigration. Eighty five percent of
Magun and Litvintseva's respondents declared that they would like to go
abroad for temporary work, forty nine percent want to leave the country
permanently, provided a decent position is available, and 19 percent want
to emigrate at any price.
All this should come as no surprise. Russia 's economy is sputtering. The
country lacks the legal or a binding moral order. The internal standards
had been compromised long ago by the hypocrisy of the communist elite
and too stringent external control. To cheat on or withdraw from the allpowerful Soviet state was risky but not amoral; in a way, that was the

only chance to feel free. Now the external control is loose and there are
neither moral restrictions nor role models. There is much public talk about
morality, universal human values, and religious renaissance but the real
situation is that of complete anomie, lawlessness, and normlessness.
Although the old communist bureaucracy is bankrupt, the so-called
"democrats" are not much better. All too often they come across as
irresponsible chatterboxes full of false promises. Once swept to power,
some proved to be even more corrupt than their predecessors. Ironically,
there is more corruption and cynicism today than under Brezhnev's rule,
when the officialdom paid some homage to appearances and feared losing
its privileges. Before 1985, the Soviet Union was the most hypocritical
country in the world, now it is the most cynical one.
The moral lesson the young people are likely to learn these days is that
everyone is for himself, or, as Ilia Ilf and Evgeny Petrov put it long ago,
"Rescuing the drowning is the task that belongs to the drowning man
himself." As the survival strategy in times of cataclysm, this is better than
the learned helplessness. But this hardly qualifies as a moral imperative.
The moral situation in Russia today is muddled to the point of being
schizophrenic. The law is routinely flouted, property-grabbing passes for
privatization, disoriented people desperately search for ways to stay
afloat, hurting each other in the process. The prescribed remedies are
extreme and contradictory. Absolute individual freedom and total selfreliance are praised in the same breath as stern discipline and Christian
virtues. The individualistic, liberal position seems to be more in line with
the market economy, democratic pluralism, and values espoused by the
younger generation. Contemporary Russian youth looks more pragmatic
and down to earth than idealistic and romantic. In a situation where the
familiar order has dissolved and nothing is guaranteed, the return to the
materialistic values of economic and physical security seems natural and
inevitable. Yet this trend may be temporary. When -- and if -- a certain
standard of living is recovered, the global shift towards postmaterialist
values, including moral pluralism, may well be the order of the day.
The socio-economic trends in today's Russia do not lend themselves
readily to an unambiguous judgment. We know where we are coming
from, but we are less sure where we are heading and where and when we
will get there. It would be naive to mistake primitive capital accumulation
and the upsurge of organized crime in the country for a moral renaissance
and a restoration of the "universal values." Thomas Hobbes's dictum -war of each against all -- describes the current realities well. The Russian

word for this situation where there are no moral limits is bespredel. The
word comes from the criminal lingo, and it tells us a lot about the moral
state in the country. For the young, the strong, and the predatory -- this
is the state of unlimited possibilities checked only by those stronger than
yourself. For the old, the weak, and the nonaggressive -- the same
situation means helplessness and hopelessness from which only death
could spell relief.
For those determined to survive under the current conditions, a clear
consciousness of private stakes and group interests (along the lines
enunciated by Marx in his theory of class struggle) are more useful than
abstract talk about universal human values, particularly when those
values are expounded by the political jackals and economic gangsters who
built their fortunes on the general suffering. If such high-minded sermons
are not very popular today, it is because they are often delivered by excommunists and somehow reek of the old official ideology. There is a
danger here that the old Marxism-Leninism might catch a second wind if
the social groups hardest hit by the anti-Soviet revolution realize that they
have been betrayed by the liberal intelligentsia.
In fairness, we should say that a class analysis does not preclude the
possibility of agreement. There has been some positive experience of
consensus-building accumulated in the last few years, and herein lies the
hope for the future. Even in its most primitive form, the institution of
private property encourages the owner to take personal initiative and
gives him the sense of dignity unknown to a people enslaved by the
totalitarian state. The revolutionary situation has also taught the individual
to assume personal responsibility, as the resistance to the 1991 and 1993
coups would testify. Alas, neither individual nor collective egoism can
furnish the foundation for morality. Several generations are likely to pass
before basic moral feelings, like respect for human dignity, labor, and
property, come back to life. Along the lines, one would have to contend
not only with the communist legacy but also with the harrowing memories
of the current bespredel. Given the criminal and highly distorted character
of the current capitalism, I suspect that the moral consciousness in Russia
will remain tinged with anti-bourgeois sentiments for quite a while. It is
likely to vacillate between two poles: the conservative-religious and
socialist (though not communist!). Primitive moralizing, levelling
distributive justice, and religious authoritarianism are easier to
comprehend and practice than autonomous morality and social realism.
Does this scenario offer welcome portends for the future? As a French
proverb says, "qui vivra verra. . . ."
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